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JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES'
LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS AFTER LECHMERE, INC. V.
NLRB
Susan K. Goplen
Abstract: In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court held that when interpreting
administrative statutes, the Court will defer to its own previous interpretations rather than
defer to administrative agencies' interpretations of statutes. Thus, the Court determined
that stare decisis is dominant over judicial deference to administrative agencies. The
Court decided Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB wrongly. The rationales for deference to agencies
exist whether or not the courts have addressed the statute in question. Therefore, courts
should apply the doctrine of judicial deference even when courts have previously inter-
preted a statute.
In the twentieth century, courts have shown a growing willingness
to defer to administrative agency decisions on policy matters and stat-
utory interpretations.' In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources
Defense Council,2 the Supreme Court held that if an administrative
statute is ambiguous and an agency gives a "permissible construc-
tion"3 of the statute, a court must defer to the agency decision even if
the court disagrees with the agency's interpretation of the statute.4
The Chevron standard applies in all cases involving statutory interpre-
tation by agencies.' The Court, however, has recently modified the
Chevron standard. In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,6 the Supreme Court
did not apply the Chevron standard because the Court had previously
addressed the statute in question.7 Thus, contrary to Chevron, under
Lechmere the doctrine of stare decisis takes precedence over the doc-
trine of judicial deference.
The new standard of deference outlined in Lechmere may lead to
fact-based decisions because it may be applied inconsistently.' In addi-
tion, the Court's emphasis on stare decisis in Lechmere directly con-
flicts with the Court's past reasons for adopting judicial deference.
Those reasons are agency expertise, agency flexibility, and political
accountability. First, when a court follows stare decisis rather than
agency statutory interpretations, it ignores the importance of defer-
1. See infra notes 15-32 and accompanying text.
2. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3. Id. at 843.
4. Id. at 844.
5. Id. at 842-43.
6. 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
7. Id. at 847.
8. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
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ence to agency expertise in regulatory decisions.' Second, although
stare decisis promotes consistency in the law, it is static and prevents
flexibility in the administrative process.10 Third, stare decisis prevents
judges from deferring to politically accountable administrative
agencies. " I
The Court should not favor stare decisis over defe~rence to agencies,
as in Lechmere. Instead, the Court should continue to follow the rules
for deference to agencies outlined in Chevron. The policy reasons for
deferring to agency interpretations of statutes exist even when the
courts have previously interpreted the statutes in question. Therefore,
Chevron's doctrine of judicial deference should apply regardless of
whether the statute has been interpreted by courts.
I. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES IN MODERN LAW
The growth of the bureaucratic state in the twentieth century cre-
ated new problems for the judiciary. 2 In particular, the courts
became concerned about the amount of deference that they should
give to administrative agencies' decisions.' 3 The following sections
describe the historical growth of judicial deference to administrative
agencies, the modem standard of deference to agencies outlined in
Chevron, and the apparent narrowing of the standard under Maislin
Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc. 4 In addition, the new
standard of judicial deference articulated in Lechmere will be
discussed.
A. Prior to Chevron, Courts Were Less Deferential to
Administrative Agencies
As the modem bureaucratic state evolved during the twentieth cen-
tury, both the courts and Congress struggled with the issue of judicial
deference to administrative agencies. Fifty years ago, attorneys and
law professors testified before Congress that the increasing complexity
of legislation required expert knowledge and judgment in interpreta-
9. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
12. CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREACRACY 4 (1990).
13. Id.
14. 110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990).
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Vol. 68:207, 1993
Judicial Deference to Administrative Agencies
tion of administrative statutes. 5 The legal experts concluded, there-
fore, that judges should give special deference to agency experts who
were especially familiar with the burdens and policy issues surround-
ing the implementation of administrative statutes.16  Despite these
expert opinions, Congress commanded in the Administrative Proce-
dure Act of 1946 that courts reviewing agency decisions must retain
jurisdiction over all relevant questions of law. 7 The Administrative
Procedure Act, however, did not provide any standards for judicial
review of nonlegal issues.' 8 As a result, courts developed varying stan-
dards of review for administrative agency decisions. These standards
depended largely on whether the question was one of fact, law, or a
mixed question of fact, law, and policy. 9
The standard of review for questions of fact is highly deferential.2"
Courts accept agencies' factual determinations as long as they are not
"arbitrary or capricious. ' ' 2'
Prior to 1944, the standard of review for questions of law was not
deferential because courts were, and still are, the final authority on the
interpretation of law.22  Further, the Administrative Procedure Act
specifically commanded that "the reviewing court shall decide all rele-
vant questions of law ... ."2 The standard for questions of law was
qualified in cases in which the statute delegates lawmaking powers to
the agency. In these cases, courts must show greater deference to
agency decision making. 4
15. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1941).
16. Id.
17. 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1946).
18. Id.
19. Frequently, when agencies apply statutory terms to mixed questions, the elements are so
intermingled they are difficult to separate. See EDLEY, supra note 12, at 104.
20. See, eg., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Abbott
Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
21. Vople, 401 U.S. at 416.
22. 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1946). Chevron also recognizes the supremacy of the courts in
statutory interpretation: "The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction
and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent."
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
Chevron recognizes, however, that ambiguous statutes may have more than one permissible
interpretation, and that a "permissible construction" of a statute by an agency must be upheld by
the courts. Id. at 843 n.11.
23. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
24. See, eg., United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961) (stating that when an
agency makes "a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the
agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its
legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned");
Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412 (1941) (stating that in cases where an expert determination
209
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Mixed questions of policy, fact, and law pose special problems
because different standards of review exist for questions of policy, of
fact, and of law. Policy questions require greatest deference,25 fact
questions require less deference,26 and law questior.s require the least
deference.27
Although the courts traditionally gave agency interpretations of law
less deference than questions of policy and fact, the Supreme Court
expanded its policy of deferring to agency interpretations of law as the
century progressed. In 1944, the Court held in NLRB v. Hearst28 that
when an agency interprets a broadly defined statutory term, without
the benefit of prior judicial comment on the statute, the courts must
accept the agency definition if it has "'warrant in the record' and a
reasonable basis in law."
'29
In the 1970s, the Court showed even greater deftarence to adminis-
trative agencies' legal interpretations. In Morton v. Ruiz,a° the Court
deferred to an agency's legal interpretation of a statute even though
Congress had not explicitly delegated lawmakir.g powers to the
agency.31 The Morton Court held that administrative agencies may be
required to formulate policy and to "fill any gap left, implicitly or
explicitly, by Congress." 32 Thus, the Morton Court determined that
agencies had the authority to fill gaps left in a statute by Congress, and
that these agency determinations would have the force of law.
"has been left to an administrative body, this delegation will be respected and the administrative
conclusion left untouched").
25. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 207-09 (1947) (stating that policy judgments are
"entitled to the greatest amount" of deference by appellate courts because administrative
agencies are better equipped to make policy decisions).
26. See, eg., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)
(stating that agency factual determinations will be accepted if they are not "arbitrary or
capricious," and that courts cannot substitute their own factual determinations for agencies'
factual determinations); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-76
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (stating that review of facts and review of policy judgments differ conceptually,
and courts must be more sensitive when reviewing agency policy judgments than facts).
27. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968)
(stating that although the agency's interpretation of a statute might be entitled to some deference,
the courts are the final authority to determine the construction of the statute); Petrou Fisheries,
Inc. v. ICC, 727 F.2d 542, 545 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that courts should give little deference to
agency's legal interpretations because agencies "[possess] no special skill in statutory
interpretation").
28. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
29. Id. at 131.
30. 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
31. Id. at 230-31.
32. Id. at 231.
210
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B. The New Chevron Standard Mandates Judicial Deference to
Permissible Administrative Interpretations of Law
The Supreme Court articulated the modem test for judicial review
of administrative agency interpretations of law in Chevron, USA.,
Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council.33 The Court held in Chev-
ron that courts must accept an administrative agency's reasonable
interpretation of any ambiguous terms of a statute when the agency is
charged with administering that statute.34 When reviewing agency
decisions, Chevron holds that courts must use a two-step process.
First, the court must determine whether the statute is ambiguous.35 If
Congress' intent is clear, the statute is not ambiguous and the agency
must follow the clear meaning of the statute.36
If the statute is ambiguous, however, the court must move to the
second step of the analysis. In the second step, the court determines
whether the agency interpretation is based on a "permissible construc-
tion of the statute."37 If it is a "permissible construction," the court
must defer to the agency.38 A court may find that the agency used a
"permissible construction" of the statute even where the court does
not conclude that the agency interpretation is the only permissible
interpretation, or that the court would have interpreted the statute in
the same way had the question first arisen in a judicial proceeding.39
A permissible interpretation is merely one that is not "arbitrary, capri-
cious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." 4
The Chevron court gave three primary policy rationales for defer-
ring to administrative agencies' statutory interpretations: agency
expertise, agency flexibility, and political accountability. First, the
Court stated that the complexity of modem bureaucracy necessitates
deference to agencies because judges are not experts in the field but
agencies can develop the requisite expertise.41 Consequently, judicial
deference to agencies is particularly appropriate in cases where the
33. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
34. Id. at 843-44.
35. Id. at 342-43.
36. Id. at 843.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 844.
39. Id.
40. Id. Chevron's standard for deference to agency legal interpretations of ambiguous statutes
is virtually identical to the standard of deference for agency factual determinations. See supra
note 26 and accompanying text. Chevron's standard of deference to agency legal interpretations
contrasts with the lesser standard of deference traditionally given to agency's legal
interpretations. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
41. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
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regulations are "technical and complex."'42 Furthermore, Chevron
states that the executive branch is more capable than the judicial
branch of "resolving the competing interests which Congress itself
either inadvertently did not resolve; or intentionally left to be resolved
by the agency .... Thus, courts should defer to agencies because
agencies have firsthand knowledge of the circumstances surrounding
the application of statutes.
Second, agencies' statutory interpretations provide flexibility.'
Courts are bound by their prior decisions under the doctrine of stare
decisis. In contrast, agencies are free to modify their policies on a
continuing basis to adapt to changing conditions or new information.45
For example, the Supreme Court has consistently held that agencies
are free to change their interpretations of statutes in response to social
and technological changes.46 The Chevron Court stated that to make
informed decisions, agencies must continually consider varying inter-
pretations of statutes and the wisdom of the agencies' policies.47 Stare
decisis does not allow courts to be as flexible as agencies.
Third, the Court stressed in Chevron that agencies are more politi-
cally accountable than the judiciary so it is more appropriate for agen-
cies to make legal decisions involving government policy." Agencies
derive their political accountability from the President.49 Although
agencies are not elected by the people, the head of the executive
branch is elected. As the head of the executive branch, the President
appoints agency heads and oversees agencies' operations.5 0 The judici-
ary, on the other hand, has no political accountability because it has
no constituency.51 The Chevron Court held that judges must respect
the policy choices made by those who are politically accountable, i.e.
agencies." The Court said that it is "entirely appropriate" for the
executive branch, under the President's leadership, to balance the pol-
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 864.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990); Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, (1978), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 935 (1980); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S.
251 (1975).
47. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864.
48. Id. at 865.
49. Id.
50. U.S. CoNST. art. II.
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icy interests involved in administrative statutory interpretation.5 3
Thus, for the combined reasons of agency expertise, agency flexibility,
and political accountability, the Supreme Court in Chevron stated that
courts must defer to administrative agencies' legal interpretations that
are reasonable and consistent with statutes.5 4
C. Chevron is Modified: Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary
Steel, Inc.
Chevron is the last in a long line of cases that give significant defer-
ence to administrative agencies. Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Pri-
mary Steel, Inc.,5s however, began a countervailing trend that limits
the circumstances in which courts use the Chevron analysis. In Mais-
lin, the United States Supreme Court refused to apply the Chevron
analysis in a case where the court had a long history of insisting on a
literal interpretation of a statute.
5 6
The Maislin Court overturned an Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Act.57 Under the
Interstate Commerce Act,5 8 common motor carriers must file freight
transport rates with the ICC. 9 Both carriers and shippers must
adhere to these transport rates' unless the carrier's rates or practices
are unreasonable.6 1 The ICC has the authority to determine whether a
rate or practice is unreasonable. 2 If the ICC finds a practice or rate is
unreasonable, the ICC may substitute a different rate or practice.63
Under the "reasonableness" exception in the Interstate Commerce
Act, the ICC allowed carriers and shippers to charge rates lower than
those filed with the ICC.64 In 1986, the ICC changed the strict rule of
adhering to tariff rates because changes in the motor carrier industry
made adherence to rates unreasonable.65
The Supreme Court reversed the ICC interpretation of the Inter-
state Commerce Act, and held that the Act prohibited any deviation
53. Id.
54. Id. at 864-65.
55. 110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990).
56. Id. at 2768.
57. Id.
58. 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (1988).
59. Id. § 10762(a)(1).
60. Id. § 10761(a).
61. Id. §§ 10701(a), 10704(a)(1).
62. Id. § 10704(a)(1).
63. Id.
64. National Indus. Transp. League, 3 I.C.C.2d 99 (1986).
65. Id. at 106.
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from the rate filed with the ICC.6 6 The Court did not apply the Chev-
ron test in Maislin. The Court held that the ICC decision was incon-
sistent with the "reasonableness" exception in the Interstate
Commerce Act.6 7 Although the Court primarily relied on the text of
the statute,68 the Court also relied on its own eighty-year history of
strict interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Act.69
The two dissenters in Maislin, Justice Stevens and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, argued that a strict adherence to the majority opinion
would produce "absurd results" and serve no social purpose.70 More-
over, the dissenters argued, the majority did not use the Chevron doc-
trine when the majority determined the ICC statutory interpretation
was invalid.71 The majority concluded the agency's interpretation was
inconsistent with "the statutory scheme as a whole,"72 but the dissent-
ers claimed that the Court mistakenly reached this conclusion by rely-
ing on previous court cases.73 Given the reasonableness of the ICC
interpretation, the dissenters concluded that the Court should have
deferred to the ICC decision.74
One commentator argues that because the Court refused to consider
recent changes in the motor carrier industry, as well. as recent statutes
affecting motor carriers, the majority used an overly rigid interpreta-
tion of the Interstate Commerce Act. 75 Furthermore, this interpreta-
66. Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759, 2768 (1990). The
Interstate Commerce Act states: "[The] carrier may not charge or receive a different
compensation for that transportation or service than the rate specified in the tariff." 49 U.S.C.
§ 10761(a) (1988).
67. Maislin, 110 S. Ct. at 2768.
68. Reliance on statutory language is particularly emphasized in Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion. Although Justice Scalia acknowledges that the majority in Maislin relied for authority
on past Supreme Court decisions, this reliance was proper as these decisions were not based on
"the regulatory climate within which the statute then operated" but rather on the "text of the
statute." Id. at 2771.
69. Id. at 2768. As the majority explained: "Once we have determined a statute's clear
meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an
agency's later interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of the statute's
meaning." Id.
70. Id. at 2779. Under Maislin, if a carrier filed for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee could
bill the shipper for the filed rate rather than the negotiated rate. Id. at 2768. This result, Justice
Stevens argued, would produce a "bonanza" for the bankruptcy bar because it would produce a
windfall for unsecured creditors. Id. at 2780.
71. Id. at 2779.
72. Id. at 2768.
73. Id. at 2779.
74. Id.
75. Dennis L. Murphy, Maislin Industries, U.S. Inc. v. Primary Ste.cl, Inc.: What Happened
to Deference?, 41 CASE W. Ras. L. REV. 627, 638 (1991).
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tion produced a harsh result for the interested parties.7 6 Such a result
would not have occurred, the commentator argues, if the Court had
deferred to the ICC's greater expertise. 7 Further, the commentator
hypothesized that the Court in Maislin was less concerned with defer-
ence to administrative agencies and more concerned with sending a
message to Congress to prevent shoddy legislation.78 In so doing,
however, the Court created a precedent that prohibits the application
of Chevron in cases where courts have a long history of strictly inter-
preting a statute.
In Maislin, the Court placed greater emphasis on the doctrine of
stare decisis than it did in Chevron. Consequently, the Lechmere deci-
sion, which followed soon after Maislin, must be examined in the new
judicial context where the Court is reluctant to defer to agencies' stat-
utory interpretations when the Court has already interpreted the
statute.
D. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB
L The Facts
The dispute in Lechmere centered on the rights of nonemployee
union organizers to distribute literature on the private property of a
nonunion company.79 Lechmere, Inc. owned a retail store in a shop-
ping plaza.80 Union organizers had planned to distribute brochures on
Lechmere employees' car windshields.81 The company prevented
them from gaining access to the employee parking lot.82 The
organizers filed a grievance with the NLRB, charging that Lechmere's
acts violated sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).83 Section 7 of'the NLRA guarantees employees the right to
76. Id. at 628. This "harsh result" is a product of recent changes in the motor carrier
industry. Before the passage of the Motor Carrier Act, carriers were more widely regulated and
uniformly charged the same rate for all freight shipped similar distances. As a result, it was not
difficult for shippers to discover the filed rate. See Negotiated Rates I, 2 I.C.C.2d 99, 104 (1986).
The Motor Carrier Act gave carriers broad authority to set prices. Carriers today must offer
competitive prices on short notice. Because hundreds of motor carrier rates may be negotiated
daily, shippers have a difficult time determining whether a negotiated rate is actually on file.
77. Murphy, supra note 75, at 638.
78. Id.
79. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 844 (1992).
80. Id. at 843.
81. Id. at 844.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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organize themselves.84 Section 8 prohibits employers from interfering
with employee self-organization.
85
An administrative law judge found for the union organizers, and
ordered Lechmere to "cease and desist" from barring organizers
access to the parking lot. 6 The NLRB affirmed this decision, relying
in part on its decision in Jean Country v. Retail & Wholesale Employ-
ees Union. 7 The First Circuit Court of Appeals also approved the
administrative judge's order. 8 The First Circuit held that the
NLRB's balancing test for resolving conflicts was entitled to deference
because it was consistent with the National Labor Relations Act.89
Furthermore, the First Circuit determined that the NLRB's decision
was entitled to deference even if it departed from the prior policy of
the NLRB.90
2. The Lechmere Holding
The Supreme Court in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB 9 ' reversed the
Court of Appeals. In reaching its decision, the Court rejected Jean
Country, stating that Jean Country rested on "erroneous legal founda-
tions."92 The Court stated that Jean Country conflicted with previous
Supreme Court decisions93 and relied on a mistaken interpretation of
Hudgens v. NLRB.9 4 The NLRB in Jean Country interpreted
Hudgens to mandate a balancing test between the rights of the employ-
84. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). 29 U.S.C. § 157 states:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or asist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection
85. National Labor Relations Act § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988) states: "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 157 .... "
86. Lechmere, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 92 (1988)
87. 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988). In Jean Country, the NLRB implemented § 7 of the NLRA
using a balancing test: the employee's rights must be balanced against the employer's property
rights and the availability of alternative ways to communicate with employees. Id. at 14.
88. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 313, 324-25 (lst Cir. 1990).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 318. The NLRB was free to depart from its prior policy because agencies are
allowed to change their statutory interpretations in response to new information or changing
social conditions. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
91. 112 S. Ct. 841, 850 (1992).
92. Id. at 849.
93. Id. at 848.
94. Id.; see also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
216
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ees and the property rights of the employer.95 The Lechmere majority
claimed that this was an inappropriate interpretation of Hudgens. 96
After rejecting Jean Country, the Court said the appropriate test
was found in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 97 not Hudgens. 98 The
Babcock Court had held that employers need not accommodate non-
employee organizers unless the employees are otherwise inaccessible.99
The Lechmere majority then defined "inaccessibility" narrowly. The
Court held that employees are "inaccessible" only where the plant
location or the employees' living quarters are beyond the reach of rea-
sonable efforts of communication."° The majority reasoned the Lech-
mere employees were not "inaccessible" because the union could have
contacted the employees through phone calls, mail, or signs off of the
employer's property."' 1 The Court concluded based on these findings
that the organizers were not entitled to access to Lechmere's private
property.
3. The Lechmere Dissents
The dissenters, Justices Stevens, White, and Blackmun, disagreed
with the majority's interpretation of Babcock They argued that the
majority had interpreted the Babcock exception far more broadly than
it had ever been interpreted in the past.10 2 The dissenters cited two
cases supporting their position. First, in Central Hardware Co. v.
NLRB,l0 the Court had held that the guiding principle for resolving
conflicts between section 7 rights and the property rights of employers
was "accommodation.""m The Lechmere dissenters argued that the
word "accommodation" indicates flexibility in balancing the
employer's property rights and the employees' rights to self-organ-
ize.105 Second, in Hudgens v. NLRB, 0 6 the Court again chose
"accommodation" as the principle to be used when balancing the
interests of employers and employees. The Hudgens Court held that
the appropriate "accommodation" between the interests of employees
95. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 848.
96. Id.
97. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
98. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 848.
99. Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112.
100. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 849.
101. Id. at 849-50.
102. Id. at 850 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 854 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
104. Id. at 544.
105. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 851.
106. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
217
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and employers depended primarily on context, and that the responsi-
bility for finding the appropriate accommodation between interests
rested with the NLRB.1
0 7
Although Central Hardware and Hudgens did not purport to mod-
ify Babcock, the dissenters argued that these cases supported a more
flexible rule than the one used in Lechmere. 08 The dissenters argued
that the cases indicated that the appropriate test should balance the
interests of both employers and employees. 109 The majority test did
not attempt to balance the interests of the parties. Instead, the major-
ity focused on the accessibility of employees. 110 Because previous
Supreme Court cases indicated a more flexible standard focusing on
interests of employees and not simply on their accessibility, the dis-
senters argued the facts in Lechmere supported the organizers' right of
access to the employee parking lot."' Therefore, the Court should not
have reversed the NLRB decision in Lechmere because the NLRB
found an appropriate accommodation between the interests of the
employees and the employer."12
Two of the dissenters, Justices White and Blacknun, gave an even
more fundamental reason for disagreeing with the majority. They
argued that Babcock should not control because Babcock was decided
over thirty years before Chevron. They reasoned that if Babcock had
been decided under the Chevron rule, Babcock would have been
decided differently.' 13 Justices White and Blackinun argued that
under the Chevron rule, the Babcock Court would have deferred to the
NLRB's construction of the statute.' 4 According to this dissent, the
majority did not use the appropriate standard of judicial review."' 5
The dissenters argued the Court only had to determine whether the
NLRB ruling is rational and consistent with the statate, as outlined in
Chevron. 116 The agency's position did not have to match the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the statute.' '7 Rather, the interpretation
must be "reasonable."
'"i8
107. Id. at 522.
108. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 851.
109. Id. at 852.
110. Id.
111. Id. (White, J., dissenting); id. at 854 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 852.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 853.
116. See id. at 852-53.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 852.
218
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Because the Lechmere Court substituted its own statutory construc-
tion for a permissible construction given by the NLRB, the dissenters
argued that Lechmere conflicts with Chevron. "9 In fact, by failing to
apply Chevron analysis, the dissenters stated that the Court caused the
doctrine of judicial deference to administrative agencies to revert to a
pre-Chevron standard. 2 ' They said that the pre-Chevron standard
gave less deference to administrative agencies, and resulted in the
adoption of "static judicial construction[s]."'' 2 Furthermore, the dis-
senters felt a pre-Chevron standard could not adequately defer to agen-
cies because courts could take over the agency's job of making policy
decisions.1
22
II. THE NEW LECHMERE STANDARD DOES NOT GIVE
ADEQUATE DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES
As stated earlier, Chevron analysis requires courts to use a two-part
test.' 23 First, the court must determine whether a statute is ambigu-
ous. Under Chevron, the Court can strike down agency interpretations
of statutes that are not ambiguous.124 If the statute is ambiguous,
however, the court must then determine whether an agency gave a
permissible interpretation of the statute.' 25 If the agency interpreta-
tion is permissible, the Court must defer to the agency
interpretation.
26
In Lechmere, the Court did not analyze the NLRA to determine
whether it was ambiguous, or whether the NLRB interpreted any stat-
utory ambiguity in a permissible way. Instead, the Court concluded
that it did not have to use the Chevron analysis because it had previ-
ously interpreted the NLRA. 127 Because the Court did not use the
Chevron standard to analyze the NLRA, Lechmere modifies Chevron
by limiting the cases when Chevron analysis is used. The Court's anal-
ysis in Lechmere is flawed. The Court undervalues the importance of
agency expertise, agency flexibility, and political accountability when
it favors stare decisis over deference to agency interpretations. Courts
119. See id.
120. See id. at 853.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 852.
123. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
124. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 844.
127. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S.Ct. 841, 847-48 (1992).
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should defer to permissible statutory interpretations of agencies rather
than follow stare decisis.
A. The Lechmere Holding Limits the Application of the Chevron
Standard of Deference to Agency Legal Interpretations
Chevron directs courts to first look to the wording of statutes to
determine whether agency interpretations are "permissible."' 28 If the
court determines an agency interpretation is "permissible," the court
must defer to the agency interpretation. 129 The Lechmere case hinges
on the interpretation of section 7 and section 8(a)(.) of the National
Labor Relations Act. 3 ' Neither section of the NLRA directly
addresses the issue of the rights of nonemployee union organizers.1
3 '
Because the statute does not mention nonemployee union rights, the
Court could have determined that the statute gives nonemployee
union organizers no rights.'32 If the Court had found that non-
employee union organizers had no rights under sections 7 or 8(a)(1) of
the NLRA, then the Court could find the NLRB's interpretation of
the statute impermissible.
The Court determined, however, that nortemployee union
organizers had rights under the statute, as defined by Babcock "I The
Court recognized employees' rights to learn from nonemployees about
union organization. The Court also recognized an employer's obliga-
tion, in limited circumstances, to grant the nonemployee union
organizers access to its property.134 Thus, the Ccurt held that the
union had rights that were not explicitly granted by statute.
135
Because nonemployee rights were not explicitly granted in the statute,
by definition these rights must be ambiguous.
If nonemployee rights to organize unions are part of the statute and
they are ambiguous by definition, Chevron and its line of authorities
permit the NLRB to fill the gap left by Congress to determine the
128. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
132. The Lechmere majority explained that "by its plain terms.... the NLRA confers rights
only on employees, not on unions or their nonemployee organizers." Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,
112 S. Ct. 841, 845 (1992). Thus, one possible interpretation of the ststute is that it confers no
rights on nonemployees. The dissenters in Lechmere also acknowledged the possibility of this
interpretation: "[Tihe language of § 7 .... speaks only of the rights of employees; i.e. the Court
might have found that § 7 extends no access rights at all to union representatives." Id. at 852.
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scope of those rights. 1 36 The agency's definition should be upheld
unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the stat-
ute." 137 The Court concluded, however, that the NLRB's balancing
test for measuring those rights was an "impermissible" construction of
the statute.1
3 8
1. Lechmere's Standard Is Inconsistent with Chevron's Standard
In determining that the NLRB's statutory construction was imper-
missible, the Court did not use the Chevron standard of classifying the
interpretation as "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute." Instead, the Court said that the NLRB's interpretation
rested on "erroneous legal foundations."' 139 Apparently, Lechmere's
"erroneous legal foundations" standard replaces Chevron's "arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute" standard." There-
fore, Lechmere uses a different standard than Chevron when determin-
ing the deference the Court should give to agency determinations.
The Lechmere majority attempts, however, to reconcile its new
standard with Chevron. The majority claims that Babcock "[was] say-
ing, in Chevron terms, that § 7 speaks to the issue of nonemployee
access to an employer's property." '' This statement is flawed. Bab-
cock was decided thirty years before Chevron. Therefore, it could not
speak in "Chevron terms." Babcock was decided under a pre-Chevron
analysis that gave little deference to agency interpretations of law or
"mixed questions" of law, fact, and policy. 142 There is no indication
in Babcock that the Court made any attempt to use Chevron-type anal-
ysis. Thus, the Court cannot reconcile Lechmere with Chevron using
its Babcock rationale. Babcock preceded Chevron and did not utilize
Chevron's standard.
The Court cannot reconcile Lechmere with Chevron because Lech-
mere is a modification of Chevron. The Chevron Court implicitly dele-
gated to agencies the authority to interpret statutes.143 Thus, courts
should apply the Chevron standard in all cases regarding deference to
administrative agencies, even if the court had previously addressed the
statute in question. The Supreme Court refused to use Chevron analy-
136. See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
137. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
138. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 848.
139. Id. at 849.
140. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
141. Id. at 848.
142. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
143. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44, 865-66.
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sis in Lechmere, however, because the Court had previously inter-
preted the statute in question. Thus, Lechmere has modified Chevron
so that the Chevron standard only applies to cases where the Court has
not previously addressed the statute in question.
2. Inconsistency in the Application of the Standard of Judicial
Deference May Lead to Fact-based Decisions
Although Lechmere modifies Chevron by limiting its application
and placing increased importance on stare decisis, four of the justices
have not consistently applied the modification of the doctrine. Both
Justice White and Justice Blackmun, the standard bearers for judicial
deference in Lechmere, signed the majority opinion in Maislin. 1' Jus-
tice Stevens and Chief Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, argued at
length about the importance of Chevron in their dissent in Maislin, '45
yet they did not invoke Chevron analysis in Lechmere. 146 The incon-
sistency with which these justices apply stare decisis analysis and
Chevron analysis indicates that these analyses may be invoked by some
justices solely on a fact-specific basis. 147
If the Court does not apply Chevron consistently, it reverts to a pre-
Chevron standard. Prior to Chevron, the Court used. a lower standard
of deference.'14  If the Court uses a lower standard of deference, the
Court will "defer" to the agency decisions with which the Court
agrees. This is not deference at all, but a "rubber stamping" of the
agency decision. The Court's refusal to apply Chevron in all adminis-
trative law cases suggests a return to a lower standard of deference.
Such an ad hoe application of Chevron makes it a functionally useless
doctrine, because one of Chevron's primary purposes was to prevent
result-oriented judicial decisions.
149
144. Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990).
145. Id. at 2779.
146. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 844 (1992).
147. Nor is the inconsistency in the application of Chevron confined to Maislin and Lechmere.
Professor Douglas Leslie has commented on the Supreme Court's failure to defer to an agency
interpretation in another labor law case:
Had the members of the Supreme Court liked the Board's result in this case, we probably
would have found in the Court's opinion references to the Board's expertise and comments
about the Board's role as the primary interpreter of the statute. Not liking the result in this
case, the Court doesn't include such language.
DOUGLAS LESLIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: PROCESS AND POLICY 448 (2d ed.
1985).
148. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
149. The importance of consistent application of the standard of deference is implied in
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At least one commentator has argued that judicial objectivity is
impossible, and that courts should simply give up on notions of judi-
cial deference and concentrate solely on sound governance.150 This
commentator's critiques are valid. It is not clear, however, that a con-
sistent application of the standard enunciated in Chevron would neces-
sarily lead to fact-specific holdings. Under Chevron, courts are still
able to overturn agency decisions that directly conflict with statutes.
Courts are only required to defer to agencies when the agency makes
reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Under a pre-Chev-
ron standard, however, courts need not consistently defer to an agency
when the agency reasonably interprets an ambiguous statute. There-
fore, the pre-Chevron standard of deference necessarily leads to result-
oriented decisions because the Court need not defer to any agency stat-
utory interpretation with which it does not agree.
The change of four justices' positions between Lechmere and Mais-
lin indicates that judges may inconsistently apply the new standard of
giving more weight to stare decisis than to deference to administrative
agencies. Lack of consistency in application of a standard of deference
leads to result-oriented decisions. One of the central purposes of Chev-
ron was to eliminate fact-determined results when determining the
degree of deference to agencies' statutory interpretations. This pur-
pose of Chevron may be invalidated by Lechmere.
B. The Lechmere Holding Is at Odds with the Policy Rationales for
Deference to Administrative Agencies
Allowing stare decisis to take precedence over deference to adminis-
trative agencies creates a harmful judicial standard. Not only may
judges apply stare decisis inconsistently, but the new standard also
thwarts the policy rationales for Chevron: agency expertise, the
150. This is the thesis of Christopher Edley's book. See EDLEY, supra note 12. Professor
Edley argues that attempting to find standards for deferring to agency decisions is not simply
futile, but may be harmful as well:
[Fact-specific decision making] is inevitable for all but the most self-denying jurists,
notwithstanding the volumes of judicial rhetoric stating that the court must uphold
'reasonable' agency action even if the choice is not what the judge would have made had the
responsibility been his or hers. The price of indirectness, therefore, is that this inevitable
judicial discretion and subjectivity is obscured by doctrinal exegesis .... But the doctrine
should frame and illuminate choices, not make them obscure. It would be far preferable
were judicial attention to soundness more direct and more explicit . . . . Accountibility
would be enhanced.
See id. at 220.
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importance of flexibility in administrative decision-making, and the
political accountability of the executive branch.51
L Agency Expertise
When a court follows stare decisis rather than reasonable agency
statutory interpretations, it ignores the importance of deference to
agency expertise in regulatory decisions. The Court in Chevron argues
that the complexity of modem bureaucracy necessitates giving defer-
ence to agency decisions because agencies have greater expertise, par-
ticularly in highly technical areas.1 52 Courts can never have the
"hands-on" experience of administering statutes that agencies have.
Judges cannot have the experience agencies have in dealing with the
complex range of conditions that impact the administering of a stat-
ute. The Lechmere standard ignores the importance of giving
credence to the expertise of professionals who have experience in
administering statutes.
Failing to defer to agency expertise may lead to poor court deci-
sions. In Maislin, the Court overturned an Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) determination of common canier rates partially
because the ICC's interpretation was inconsistent with an eighty-year-
old interpretation of rates issued by the Court.153 This led, however, to
unusually harsh results for the parties involved. 'In fact, the Court
probably inadvertently promoted the bankruptcy of freight carriers
because the Maislin decision enabled bankruptcy trustees to bill cus-
tomers for higher rates than customers agreed to pay.1 54 By refusing
to allow the agency to change the Court's interpretation of an eighty-
year-old statute, the Court helped to create fiscal irresponsibility in the
freight carrier industry. If the Court had deferred to agency expertise
in Maislin, this unfortunate result would not have occurred.
2. Flexibility
The Lechmere standard also undermines administrative agencies'
flexibility in interpreting statutes. Chevron explicitly discusses the
importance of giving agencies the freedom to modify their policies to
adapt to changing conditions or new information. 55 Even before
151. See supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
153. Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759, 2768 (1990).
154. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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Chevron was decided, the Court consistently held that agencies were
not bound by their own past statutory interpretations. 156
Although Justice Scalia does not agree with the dissenters in Lech-
mere, he argues that permitting flexibility, and preventing the rigidity
of stare decisis, is one of the major advantages of Chevron. 157 In fact,
he argues, stare decisis itself may hamper the administrative process.
Once the courts resolve ambiguities in statutes they "resolve them for
ever and ever," and the only way to produce change is to amend the
statute.' 58 Consequently, stare decisis may force Congress to act to
overturn outdated court interpretations of statutes. This is inefficient
for Congress, the agencies, and everyone impacted by the statutory
regulation.
Furthermore, stare decisis applies with equal force regardless of the
amount of time that has passed since the court interpreted the statute.
Lechmere was decided on the basis of a thirty-year-old statutory inter-
pretation. Lechmere refused to recognize the logistical difficulties that
nonemployee union organizers have in contacting employees.' 59 This
is partially a result of the growing numbers of workers who commute
long distances, a social phenomenon that basically did not exist thirty
years ago. Maislin was decided on the basis of an eighty-year-old stat-
utory interpretation. Maislin did not recognize the changes that
occurred in the motor carrier industry as a result of deregulation."'
The Courts failure to recognize these changes ultimately created a sit-
uation where some motor carriers gain financially by declaring bank-
ruptcy rather than staying in business.' 6 ' Consequently, as Lechmere
and Maislin demonstrate, stare decisis cannot meet those changing
social conditions that could have or should have impacted statutory
implementation.
3. Political Accountability
Finally, the new Lechmere standard does not acknowledge the
importance of deferring to the more politically accountable branch of
government. Administrative law by its nature is directed by con-
stantly changing policy decisions, and therefore should be directly
impacted by "politics" and administered by a politically accountable
156. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
157. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 517.
158. Id.
159. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 76.
161. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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branch of government. Although bureaucrats are unelected, they are
a part of the executive branch whose leader, the President, is elected.
Therefore, agencies have some measure of political accountability,
unlike the judiciary.162 Therefore, judges should not change policy
decisions made by the executive branch that further government poli-
cies and do not conflict with statutes.
The Chevron rationales of administrative expertise, agency flexibil-
ity, and political accountability exist whether or not a court has previ-
ously interpreted the statute in question. A court should therefore
defer to permissible agency statutory interpretations regardless of
whether the court has previously interpreted the statute.
III. CONCLUSION
The Lechmere decision held that a court should not defer to admin-
istrative agency interpretations of law when the court has previously
interpreted the statute in question. The Court's emphasis on stare
decisis may appear to promote consistency in these cases. In fact,
however, stare decisis as applied in the Lechmere and Maislin cases
may only produce more inconsistency because various justices
changed their positions on when it was necessary to defer to adminis-
trative agencies. More importantly, the policy rationales for judicial
deference, political accountability, agency expertise, and flexibility
exist regardless of whether a court has addressed the statute in ques-
tion. Therefore, a court should defer to permissible statutory interpre-
tations by agencies even if the court has addressed the statute
previously.
162. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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